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ABSTRACT
Social media provides a critical communication platform for
political figures, but also makes them easy targets for harass-
ment. In this paper, we characterize users who adversarially
interact with political figures on Twitter using mixed-method
techniques. The analysis is based on a dataset of 400 thousand
users’ 1.2 million replies to 756 candidates for the U.S. House
of Representatives in the two months leading up to the 2018
midterm elections. We show that among moderately active
users, adversarial activity is associated with decreased central-
ity in the social graph and increased attention to candidates
from the opposing party. When compared to users who are
similarly active, highly adversarial users tend to engage in
fewer supportive interactions with their own party’s candi-
dates and express negativity in their user profiles. Our results
can inform the design of platform moderation mechanisms to
support political figures countering online harassment.
Author Keywords
Online Harassment; Twitter; User Behavior; Political
Candidates
CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing → User studies; Empirical
studies in HCI;
INTRODUCTION
Social media is a natural place for political figures to connect
to the public [30, 38], both by broadcasting and — as impor-
tantly — listening to their constituents and others [14]. At the
same time, social media services have been struggling with
the prevalence of online abuse and harassment [4,8,21,22,32].
Politicians in particular are common targets of negativity on-
line, with reports consistently showing that politicians face
overwhelming amounts of online harassment [5, 45]. This
trend has discouraged some from engaging in conversations
online [59], caused others to quit seeking public office [45],
and may have chilling effects on those who would otherwise
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engage in democracy and public service. It is therefore crucial
to understand how to ensure a reasonable level of discourse on
social media for political figures and the broader public.
Making sense of incivility is complicated, with no clear defini-
tions of what types of content may cross acceptable boundaries
in which contexts. A small but growing body of research uses
data-driven analyses to increase our understanding of incivil-
ity towards politicians [29, 33, 56], complementary to similar
studies of harassment in other contexts [9, 10, 23, 40]. These
works use various definitions of “uncivil” behavior. For our
purposes, we broadly refer to messages as adversarial if they
are intended to hurt, embarrass, or humiliate a targeted indi-
vidual, although specific guidelines and accurate judgment of
such a definition is challenging, as we expand on below.
In this work, we use a combination of automated tools and
qualitative coding techniques to provide the richest charac-
terization to date of Twitter users who engage in adversarial
interactions with political candidates. Fueling this analysis
is a dataset we collected1, capturing Twitter interactions with
political candidates during the run-up to the U.S. midterm
election in November 2018. Our dataset consists of all tweets
by 1,110 accounts manually validated as used by 756 candi-
dates for the U.S. House of Representatives. Additionally, it
includes 1.2 million replies to the candidates’ tweets made
by 0.4 million unique Twitter users, and these users’ Twitter
profile information. We focus our analysis on replies to candi-
dates’ tweets. Twitter replies are, by default, visible to other
users interacting with the candidates’ tweets.
With this data, we first identify users who post adversarial
replies to any of the candidates by using Perspective API [36],
a general language tool for toxic content detection. We show
that while a significant number of adversarial interactions are
generated by users who only interact with candidates a few
times, over 35% of the adversarial replies are created by just
10% of the users who repeatedly post adversarial contents
towards candidates. We also explore the factors that are as-
sociated with higher levels of adversarial interactions with
candidates, showing that the less a user is embedded in the
political discussions with candidates in general, the more they
tend to use adversarial language when replying to candidates.
We then focus on users who engage in significantly more
adversarial activity than others. We perform qualitative coding
1Available at: https://figshare.com/articles/U_S_Midterm_
Election_Twitter_Dataset_2018/11374062
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to better understand how highly-adversarial users (those who
posted more than 10 adversarial tweets to candidates in our
dataset) are different than other user groups in terms of the
content they post and the information they expose in their
user profile. We show that, the highly adversarial users post
more personal attacks and generate more off-topic replies,
namely ones that are irrelevant to the candidate’s tweet. In
addition, these users’ Twitter profiles are more likely to contain
partisan and adversarial attacks, potentially foreshadowing
their negative activity. Finally, we evaluate how well the
automated tool we used for much of our analysis achieves
good agreement with our human coders, validating Perspective
API’s effectiveness in identifying highly-adversarial actors. If
anything, the methods we used slightly under-estimate the
amount of adversarial content these users shared.
Our work characterizes adversarial social media users in an
important societal context, those who target political candi-
dates. To this end, we perform context-specific analysis and
show findings that both extend, and conflict with, those from
previous works that also focus on adversarial users on Twitter
but in different settings [9,10,23,54]. Our work provides a bet-
ter understanding of the activities and characteristic of these
“adversarial users”, which can help inform design of social
platforms, policies against adversarial interactions, as well as
mechanisms to allow for better moderation and interactions
with political figures in social media.
RELATED WORK
A significant amount of previous work has focused on measur-
ing and understanding adversarial behaviors online, including
studies on victims’ experiences [41, 64] and attackers’ moti-
vations [11, 12, 40]. Other studies have developed machine
learning tools that can be deployed at a large scale to support
detecting personal attacks [20, 46, 65]. We focus on three
themes of related work that are pertinent to our work here: (1)
studies of online harassment on Twitter, (2) characterizing abu-
sive Twitter users, and (3) studies of adversarial interactions
against political figures.
Online harassment on Twitter. Twitter has a particularly
severe problem with the amount of online harassment on the
platform [26, 41]. Victims who are targets of ongoing ha-
rassment reported that frequent encounters with harassing
content disrupts their day-to-day lives [39]. Yet, various in-
stitutions [4, 41] have reported that harassment reports from
victims often are not addressed properly.
Detecting and characterizing abusive users on Twitter. A
number of recent projects attempt to characterize and automat-
ically identify abusive users on Twitter [9, 10, 23, 54]. Some
of the features considered by these projects include Twitter
account metadata [10, 54], personality traits [23], tweeting
patterns [40], and social network structures [9, 10, 23, 54] as-
sociated with abusive behaviors. These studies used com-
putational methods to provide quantitative insights on be-
havioral patterns of abusive Twitter users in different con-
texts [9, 10, 23, 40, 54]. Many of these works sample abusive
or hateful speech by searching for a dictionary of explicitly
offensive words [23, 40, 54], or mentions of known harass-
ment campaigns [9, 10]. Our work differs from these previous
efforts in several ways. First, we focus on an important soci-
etal context — political candidates — constructing our data
by collecting all Twitter interactions with this specific set of
users. We leverage unique aspects of this political context (e.g.,
political leanings, political engagement on social media) to
better analyze adversarial activities. Further, we complement
our quantitative measurements with context-specific analysis
based on qualitative coding to provide a deeper and more
detailed understanding of user behaviors.
Adversarial interactions against politicians. Adversarial in-
teractions against political figures, including politicians and
candidates, have been studied long before the existence of
social media (e.g., [17]). Recent surveys at politicians from
multiple countries show that most of them have experienced
both online and offline harassment [1, 24, 35, 52]. The rise of
social media provides political figures with an important chan-
nel to connect with citizens [2, 14, 51], as well as a platform
where they can be easily addressed and targeted by online
harassment [5, 24, 29, 33, 45]. It has been reported that social-
media-based abuse discourages politicians from engaging in
online conversations [59]. At the extreme, some reported quit-
ting seeking public office due to the amount of harassment on
social media [45]. Naturally, many political figures have pro-
fessional teams running their social media accounts, insulating
them to some extent from harassment. However, this does
not obviate the ill effects of adversarial content, for example
such content might have negative impact on other people who
engage with the candidate’s tweets [11].
Closest to our work is research from Gorrell et al. [28, 29],
examining Twitter harassment towards United Kingdom parlia-
ment members with emphasis on understanding what attributes
of politicians – such as party and gender – and what political
topics attract abusive replies. Our own work used the same
dataset we analyze here to study how this set of U.S. House
candidates experienced harassment on Twitter in that time
period [33]. Both works focus on measuring trends in the
adversarial interactions experienced by the candidates, such as
the different forms that adversarial interactions may take [33],
or topics that adversarial interactions focus on [28, 29]. In
contrast, our focus here is on characterizing the users that are
making adversarial posts.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC APPROACH
We use a data-driven approach to gain a better understanding
of the users who post adversarial replies to political candidates
online. We define adversarial interactions as messages posted
by users which are intended to hurt, embarrass or humiliate a
target user, following a notion that has been largely accepted
in the community [13, 18, 19, 31, 33, 40, 57]. Of course, de-
termining whether a message satisfies this definition can be
highly subjective, and we will use a combination of existing
machine learning techniques, and, in a following section, hu-
man annotations, to assess whether messages are adversarial.
Our dataset. We built on a set of 1,110 Twitter accounts
used by 786 candidates, 431 Democrats (D) and 355 Republi-
cans (R) running in 2018 for the U.S. House of Representatives
developed in our earlier work [33]. Our study is focused on
1.2 million Twitter replies to the candidates’ posts, made by
0.4 million users between September 17th and November 6th,
2018 (the day of the U.S. midterm elections). We collected
the data using the Twitter Streaming API, including all tweets
posted by, replying to, or retweeting any of the candidate ac-
counts. On Twitter, replies to public accounts directly engage
with the target account and are visible by default to the public
who are viewing the original posts. Thus, replies to candidates
directly contribute to the candidate’s own “public sphere” [60].
We therefore focus on replies to candidate posts in this work.
We do not include Twitter “mentions” of these accounts and
tweets that include a link to tweets by these accounts (often
called “quote tweets”), which may be visible to others on Twit-
ter but are not immediately available to those interacting with
a candidate’s account. We alternatively refer to tweets in our
dataset as “replies” or simply “tweets”—but note that all of
these are direct replies to tweets by the candidates.
We augment the dataset of replies with the Twitter following
network for the users in the dataset. On Twitter, analyzing
who users follow has proven to be informative for inferring
user interests and political preferences [7, 55]. We therefore
retrieve the 5,000 most-recently followed accounts by each
user in our dataset (i.e., their “Twitter friends”) using the
Twitter API [62]. Due to API rate limits, this data collection
lasted over a longer time period, from September 2018 until
March 2019. This network data is limited in at least three
ways. First, by the time of data collection, some users have
left Twitter or set their profiles to be private, preventing us
from retrieving their friends list. However, since our data
collection prioritized the more active users in our dataset, we
do not think these omissions are critical. Second, users might
follow new accounts between the time they made a reply to
a candidate and their data being collected by us, resulting
in some inaccuracies. Last, we were limited to retrieve only
the 5,000 most recent followers from any user. As a result,
we obtained the complete friends list for 92% of the users.
For an additional 4% of users who followed more than 5,000
accounts, we obtained the partial friends list. The remaining
4% of accounts were deleted or suspended at the time of our
network data collection.
Note that it is possible that organized information opera-
tions took place on Twitter during our data collection period,
whether using bots powered by automated algorithms [16, 25]
or through state-operated campaign [6, 34]. We compared our
data with a list of state controlled accounts with over 5,000
followers published by Twitter [43] (as the information of this
set of accounts was not anonymized): none of them showed
up in our dataset. Further, manual review of highly-active and
highly-adversarial users as discussed later indicates that these
users exhibit sophisticated behaviors that were not likely gen-
erated by automated algorithms. Finally, most of our analyses
would remain relevant even if the accounts are automated or
are part of organized campaigns since the resultant adversarial
activities are nevertheless perceived by, and have impact on
others, e.g. the candidates and the observers.
Automated labeling of adversarial interactions. The scale
of this dataset suggests the need for a computational approach
to analyze adversarial interactions. We use machine learning
τ 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
τ-adversarial tweets (%) 28% 21% 14% 9% 4%
Average per user 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.3
Table 1: Fraction of τ-adversarial tweets in our dataset, for
varying thresholds τ , and the average number of τ-adversarial
tweets made by a user that made at least one such tweet.
tools for flagging toxic content in the first part of this work, and
as a mechanism to identify content to analyze qualitatively in
the second part of this work. Specifically, we use Perspective
API [36] to assign toxicity scores to tweets. The API has been
used before in different contexts, including Twitter [23, 33].
The scores generated by Perspective API indicate whether a
general language model, trained with Wikipedia discussions
and multiple other online conversation sources [36, 65], be-
lieves the utterance to be “discouraging participation in conver-
sations”. The API outputs a “toxicity” score in the range [0,1],
with 1 being highly toxic and 0 being non-toxic. We define a
tweet as τ-adversarial if its content has a toxicity score more
than τ . Note that although similar, toxicity is in fact a different
concept than being adversarial (see the definition we use at the
beginning of this section), as one can be toxic without being
adversarial (e.g., using foul language as expression), and ad-
versarial without being toxic (e.g., combative speech). Here,
we use toxicity in replies as an approximation of adversarial
actions. In our earlier work, we validated the precision of this
technique for 0.7-adversarial tweets, showing this method
offers high precision [33].
Nevertheless, Perspective API as well as other existing auto-
mated approaches that use general language models to flag
adversarial content [20,46] have inherent limitations, in partic-
ular having potentially low recall for some forms of adversarial
interactions. We mitigate the limitations inherent in using a
general language model in two key ways. First, we provide
analysis showing that the trends in our results are robust to
the toxicity thresholds we use in our computational analysis.
Second, we report on a large-scale qualitative coding of tweets
that helps expose whether the method is prone to specific
biases in the sources of abuse it detects.
VOLUME OF ADVERSARIAL ACTIVITY
To gain an initial understanding of the use of toxic language
by different users, we analyze the distribution of τ-adversarial
activities per user observed in our dataset. The analysis is
geared towards exposing the levels of activity of adversarial
users, and how those levels relate to the general activity levels
of users interacting with candidates. A secondary goal of
the analysis is to understand the sensitivity of these trends
to the values used for the threshold τ . In general, changing
the threshold results in a significant change to the number of
tweets classified as toxic: Table 1 provides some indication
on how raising the threshold τ decreases the number of tweets
considered as toxic.
Regardless of the specific τ , a relatively small number of
users generate a large fraction of adversarial tweets, in line
with prior studies on online communities [47, 53]. Figure 1a
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Figure 1: (a) CDF of τ-adversarial tweets contributed by users. (b) Breakdown of replies by users with different overall
activity (top row), with the fraction of adversarial tweets made by each user group, for various τ (following rows). The legend
specifies user overall activity level for each group, with the group size in percentage.
shows the cumulative fraction of τ-adversarial tweets (Y-axis)
contributed by an increasing fraction of the users (X-axis), for
various values of τ . Users are sorted in descending order of
the number of τ-adversarial tweets they made. For example,
49% of the 0.7-adversarial tweets were posted by 20% of the
users and 35% of the 0.7-adversarial tweets were generated
by just 10% of the users. Note that the total number of tweets
is different for each curve, as indicated by Table 1.
Users who had fewer overall interactions with the candidates
contribute more adversarial replies than their overall contri-
bution predicts. Figure 1b breaks down the proportion of
adversarial activity with different τ (separated by rows), con-
tributed by users with different levels of overall activity in our
dataset (shades of green). The lightest shade (left) are users
who are at or below the median (51.7% of the users in our
dataset that posted a total of 1 tweet reply to candidates). The
following darker shades are the 75th percentile (2 or 3 tweets),
90% (4–7 tweets), 99% (8–30 tweets) and 99.9% (31–100
tweets). The most active 0.1% (over 100 tweets) is in darkest
shade of green. The top row of the chart shows the breakdown
of all tweets by these groups, while the remaining rows show
a breakdown of adversarial tweets by activity level groups
for different levels of τ-adversarial content. For example, the
figure shows that 51.7% of users who replied to candidates
only once (leftmost, lightest shade) contributed 15% of all
replies (top row), but over 18% of the 0.9-adversarial replies
(second from top). Grouped together, the top 10% most active
users (the three rightmost, darkest groups) contributed 48% of
all replies (top bar) but only 39% of the 0.9-adversarial replies
(second from top bar). In summary, while “heavy” adversarial
users still carry most of the weight, Figure 1b shows that “ca-
sual” offenders reply more with adversarial content than their
overall activity predicts.
CHARACTERIZATION OF ADVERSARIAL USERS
We are interested in the tendency of users to share more adver-
sarial content than expected given their basic user characteris-
tics, engagement with political topics and adversarial behavior
of Twitter friends. To this end, we perform an analysis of a
set of moderately active users — those who posted between 4
to 30 replies to candidates. The [4,30] user group comprises
only 21% of the user base (N=74,533), but authored 50% of
all tweets and 52% of the adversarial tweets in our data. As
the distribution of user activity is highly skewed, this group
excludes the under- (users who produced fewer than 4 tweets)
and over-producers (users who produced more than 30 tweets)
of content. The over-producers were removed because their
behaviors are likely to be materially different than less active
users. The under-producers do not have enough content in
our dataset to provide meaningful analyses. We performed a
similar analysis that included the under-producers in addition
to the [4,30] user group, and the regression results reflected a
similar trend.
Specifically, we focus on three categories of features in our
analysis: the basic characteristics of the user as reflected in
their Twitter account metadata; the specific characteristics
of the user’s Twitter “political activity” (in our data); and
features that capture adversarial behaviors by a user’s friends
on Twitter. We fit these features into a linear regression to
the number of τ-adversarial tweets by the user as calculated
using Perspective API. For simplicity, we use τ = 0.7 and
refer to 0.7-adversarial tweets as “adversarial tweets” from
now on. We set this threshold based on prior work [33] and
validation of precision associated with the 0.7 threshold in the
later discussion via manual labeling. Also, as shown above,
the analysis trends are robust to small changes in τ .
Regression Features
Basic user characteristics. We start with a set of basic at-
tributes about users inspired by previous studies: their number
of followers, the age of their account, whether their account
is verified or not, and their level of activity. Prior works in
other contexts have shown that the number of followers is
correlated with abusive behavior. Interestingly, the effect is
context dependent, with some studies indicating that more fol-
lowers a user has is positively [10] correlated with adversarial
behavior while other studies show the opposite trend [9, 54].
Those prior works also use the age of an account (i.e., how
long has this user been registered on Twitter), and, again, show
differing correlations with adversarial behavior [10, 54]. Pre-
vious studies on online forums show that anonymity can be
used as a criteria to distinguish attackers from defenders of
aggressive behavior [44,66]. We do not have a robust measure
of anonymity of Twitter accounts, as even those who seem
to be using their real names could be using others’ identities.
Instead, we use the Twitter “verified” [63] status as a (limited)
replacement. This feature is offered by Twitter to users who
are public figures, and marks the fact that the user identity had
been verified by Twitter. Finally, we include the number of
replies posted by user to candidates in our dataset as a control,
to account for the heightened user activity level that may give
them more opportunity to behave in an uncivil manner.
Engagement with political topics. A second set of features
we explore captures various aspects of a user’s political activ-
ity on Twitter, including interactions with candidates, as well
as the candidate accounts followed by the user and the amount
of retweeting candidates’ posts. We use the number of candi-
dates followed and number of candidate tweets retweeted by a
user as approximate measures of a user’s interest in politics.
Using methods described in [33], we label each user as either
pro-Democrat or pro-Republican based on their retweeting of
candidates, except for 1% of the moderately active users for
whom we do not have enough retweet information to classify
partisanship, who are excluded from the analyses in this sec-
tion. Opinion conflicts are indicative features of incivility [40].
To measure the potential frequency of opinion conflicts, we
include both the number of candidates of the user’s opposing
party that the user has replied to, and the percentage of the
user’s replies that were directed towards candidates from the
opposite party.
Another measure of the user’s level of political engagement
is in their self-description. For example, some users include
partisan hashtags such as #MAGA in their Twitter profile. Us-
ing a list of partisan hashtags compiled from [33], we identify
users who express their political preferences in their user pro-
files. This feature is used in the following analysis as a signal
of a user’s partisanship. A final measure we use for political
engagement is the centrality of the users in the discussions
involving the candidates. To compute this measure, we cal-
culate the page rank score [50] of each user in our dataset in
the network of the following relationship of all the users who
reply to political candidates (i.e., all users in our full dataset).
In other words, the network is the partial graph of the Twitter
following network where the set of nodes is limited to the
users in our data.
We have also considered other factors, including absolute num-
ber of replies to candidates from the opposing party, number of
followers supporting the same party, and number of candidates
followed by the user from the party they support — but ulti-
mately excluded them from the analysis due to multicollinear-
ity [49] with other variables we are already considering.
Adversarial behavior of Twitter friends. It is known that
a user’s adversarial activity level may be associated with the
activity of their Twitter friends (i.e., the accounts a user is
following on Twitter) [3, 42]. We consider two attributes to
measure this effect: the total number of adversarial tweets
posted by a user’s Twitter friends, and the percentage of one’s
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Mean Std
(Intercept) 1.237*** 1.237*** 1.237**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of replies 1.49*** 1.314*** 1.307*** 8.14 5.21
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Account age (days) -0.04** -0.052*** -0.004 1818 1201
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of followers -0.052*** -0.036* -0.138*** 2.36 0.91
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
Verified on Twitter -0.4** -0.006 -0.218
(99.8% not verified) (0.132) (0.012) (0.136)
Number of retweets -0.032* -0.044** 0.71 0.67
(0.013) (0.013)
Candidates followed -0.048*** -0.051*** 11.4 19.6
(0.012) (0.013)
Page rank -0.068*** -0.118*** 0.09 0.08
(0.015) (0.015)
Partisan hashtag in profile (bool) 0.085*** 0.051**
(80% don’t have partisan hashtag) (0.013) (0.017)
% replies to opponent candidates 0.429*** 0.426*** 53% 38%
(0.015) (0.015)
Opponent candidates replied to 0.43*** 0.433*** 2.14 1.93
(0.016) (0.016)
Adversarial tweets posted by friends 0.076** 1.49 0.99
(0.025)
% friends posted ≥ 3 adversarial tweets 0.204*** 1.1% 1.2%
(0.017)
R2 0.18 0.227 0.231
Significance codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Table 2: Results of the regression analysis predicting the
number of adversarial tweets posted by a user (number of
users is N = 74,533). Histograms represent the distribution
of the variable. Log transformed variables are listed in italic,
with mean, standard deviation and distribution in log scale.
friends that posted at least x adversarial tweets. We use x = 3
in the following analysis, but verified that the results of x =
1,2,4,5 are similar.
Results
We analyze the power of the attributes listed above in predict-
ing the dependent variable — the number of 0.7-adversarial
tweets made by the user — using three increasingly complete
linear regression models that incrementally add each set of
features described above. Model 1 uses the basic user Twitter
features (the first group described above), including control-
ling for the user’s overall activity level. Model 2 combines
these features with the features capturing the user’s political
activity in our dataset. Finally, Model 3 adds the features
capturing adversarial behaviors of the user’s Twitter friends.
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Figure 2: Users with higher adversarial follower ratio are
generally more likely to have been suspended.
The histograms in Table 2 show the data distribution of each
variable used in the regression models, along with its average
and standard deviation (rightmost two columns). As the table
histograms show, not all variables are normally distributed. To
account for this, we log-transform the number of followers,
number of retweets, page rank score, and amount of adversar-
ial activities of Twitter friends (the italic features in Table 2).
Furthermore, all continuous variables were standardized by
centering and dividing by two standard deviations following
recommended practice [27]. The binary variables were cen-
tered in order to have the same scale for comparison. Hence
the magnitude of the standardized coefficients reflects the sig-
nificance of the variables. Table 2 also shows the results of
the regression analysis, including the standardized beta coeffi-
cients (b) and their standard errors (SE) for all three models.
The p values are computed using two-tailed t-tests. All vari-
ance inflation factors (VIFs) are less than three, indicating that
multicollinearity is not an issue in our independent variables.
Overall, the three models explain R2 = 0.18, R2 = 0.227, and
R2 = 0.231 of the variance of the dependent variable (bottom
row of the table).
Among the features included in Model 1, the number of
replies has the strongest correlation with adversarial replies
(b = 1.49): users who make more adversarial replies to can-
didates are more active in general. It retains its strength and
significance across the other two models. In Model 3, for
example, each additional reply is related to an increase of 0.13
in the number of adversarial replies (a standardized coefficient
of b = 1.307, divided by twice the standard deviation of 5.21).
Even after controlling for the overall number of replies, the
scale of adversarial activity of the user is correlated with other
attributes. For example, a higher number of followers is as-
sociated with less adversarial activity. According to Model 3,
every tenfold increase in followers is associated with a 0.08
decrease in adversarial activity. On the other hand, there is
inconsistent significance for account age and verified status
across the three models, suggesting these are not particularly
powerful predictors.
A user’s political activity attributes are strongly correlated
with level of adversarial activity. The most significant factor
is the tendency to engage with candidates from the opposing
party on Twitter. This trend was measured by the number
of opponent candidates the user replied to and the percent of
their tweets dedicated to opponent candidates, both of which
correlated with an increase in adversarial activity. An increase
of 1% in the number of replies towards opponent candidates is
correlated with a 0.006 increase in the quantity of adversarial
replies, while each additional opponent candidate replied to
raises the adversarial activity by 0.11. Including a partisan
hashtag into one’s user profile correlates with a 0.051 increase
in the predicted amount of adversarial activity. In contrast,
the centrality in the political user network measured by page
rank is negatively correlated with adversarial activity. The
less “important” users in that network tend to engage in more
adversarial interactions. Other indicators of political activity —
number of retweets and candidates followed, both associated
with partisan support — are also negatively correlated with
adversarial activity, though with less significance. For exam-
ple, according to Model 3, tenfold increases in the number of
retweets and each additional candidate followed are correlated
with 0.033 and 0.001 decrease in number of adversarial tweets,
respectively.
Finally, Model 3 shows that adversarial behaviors by friends
has strong correlation with a user’s behavior in posting adver-
sarial posts. A 1% increase in friends who posted at least three
adversarial tweets is correlated with 0.08 more adversarial
tweets posted by the user.
Overall, our findings demonstrate a number of key trends cor-
related with higher adversarial activity towards candidates on
Twitter. Users who engaged in more adversarial interactions
with candidates tend to have less followers and are less central
in the network of users interacting with candidates. In other
words, adversarial activity was higher among “fringe” users.
Further, the findings indicate that adversarial activity is corre-
lated with more attention to opponent candidates and reduced
attention to the user’s own candidates. Moreover, adversarial
activity is negatively correlated with (likely) support-oriented
activity on Twitter: the more a user retweets or follows candi-
dates (presumably, of their partisan alignment), the less adver-
sarial activity they participate in. Conversely, users who pay
relatively more attention to and interact with more candidates
from the opposing party produce more adversarial replies.
Accounts followed by Adversarial Users
The analysis above has shown that a user’s adversarial replies
to political candidates are associated with both the number of
friends who adversarially interact with candidates and the mag-
nitude of their friends’ adversarial activities. In this section
we explore whether the behaviors of the accounts followed
by disproportionally more adversarial users are indeed more
problematic. We performed an analysis by collecting data
about accounts followed by our adversarial users. Note that
these accounts may not necessarily be included in our dataset,
as they may have not replied to any House candidate during
the data collection period. In the following comparison, we
selected two groups of users from our dataset: (1) the Adver-
sarial group: users who posted at least 3 adversarial tweets,
and (2) the Baseline group: users who posted at least 3 tweets
and never posted adversarial tweets. We define the Adversar-
ial Follower Ratio (AFR) of an account as the proportion of
followers from the Adversarial group over the number of fol-
lowers from both groups. In March 2019, we queried Twitter
for the user statuses — i.e. still active on Twitter or not — of
a set of 21 million accounts who are followed by users in our
dataset. By the time of data collection, 2% of the accounts had
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Figure 3: Breakdown of tweets by different user groups, as
divided by the amount of adversarial interactions made (speci-
fied in the legend with group size in percentage).
been either deleted or suspended from Twitter. We focus on
the 97 K accounts that had at least 100 followers in total.
Figure 2 depicts the rate at which accounts with different AFR
were suspended by Twitter. Each bin represents at least 100
accounts. Interestingly, the chart shows that accounts with
higher AFR are more likely to be suspended. For example,
20% of the accounts with AFR in the range 50–55% were sus-
pended (rightmost bar), which is significantly higher than the
2% rate of suspension for all collected accounts. Account sus-
pension on Twitter may result from activities like spamming,
showing signs of account being compromised, and abusive
tweets or behavior [61]. We have no information about why
these accounts were suspended. It is possible that Twitter is
using AFR or similar metrics to prioritize moderation. More
likely, the other behaviors of these users that led to suspension
were correlated with their AFR.
ANALYSIS OF HIGHLY ADVERSARIAL USERS
It is important to consider and understand in more depth the
group of highly adversarial users, defined here as those who
made at least 11 posts that are 0.7-adversarial. Figure 3 de-
picts the proportion of all tweets (top bar) and of adversarial
tweets (bottom bar) contributed by each user group, where
the groups are based on the number of adversarial replies
made per user (unlike Figure 1b that grouped users by total
reply volume). The highly-adversarial group (dark, rightmost
area of both bars) makes up only 0.3% (1,010 users) of the
total population of users interacting with the candidates, but
these users contributed 10% of the adversarial replies to can-
didates (bottom bar). This group was very active in general,
contributing 5.6% of the total replies to candidates (top bar).
The small size of this user group allows us to use qualitative
coding methods to better understand these users’ activities.
We first evaluate the type of content they produce, in particular
in comparison to a control of replies from other highly-active
users. We also examine whether the 0.7-adversarial threshold
is in some way biased in detecting and interpreting the activi-
ties of this adversarial group compared to others. In addition
we perform an analysis based on qualitative coding of the in-
formation in the users’ profiles, extending the “use of political
hashtag” findings from the last section.
Content analysis of users’ replies to candidates. To better
understand the activities of highly adversarial users who are
responsible for an outsized amount of hostile content, we per-
formed qualitative coding of a sample of tweets from both
highly adversarial and highly active users. The analysis was
geared to address two questions: (1) Does our use of Perspec-
tive API bias our view of who is an adversarial user? For
example, users may exploit different vocabularies or engage in
actions that are easier, or harder, for general language models
to detect. (2) Does the content of negative interactions with
candidates differ between highly adversarial and highly active
users? Moreover, does the content of positive interactions
differ? Note that we use the terminology of negative/positive
here instead of adversarial/non-adversarial, as we are not only
focusing on hurtful language, but rather any kind of negative
interaction, including civil disagreement and criticism. We
make the distinction between negative and adversarial inter-
actions as many of the interactions such as attacks against the
candidate’s policy or political view may not be adversarial, i.e.,
not intending to hurt, embarrass or humiliate. Rather, negative
but civil interactions are necessary for democratic discussions.
We engaged in qualitative coding of a sample of 800 tweets
from both user groups. Specifically, we sampled 400 tweets
each from highly adversarial users with at least 11 0.7-
adversarial replies in our dataset (Uadv), and highly active
users with at least 11 replies in our dataset (Uactive, 19,797
users in total). Note that Uadv ⊂Uactive. For each group, we
sample 200 tweets that are 0.7-adversarial and 200 tweets with
adversarial score ≤0.7 (i.e., non-0.7-adversarial or “clean” ac-
cording to the threshold-based analysis). We denote these sets
of tweets Tadv,adv (adversarial users’ adversarial tweets) and,
accordingly, Tadv,clean, Tactive,adv and Tactive,clean.
The coding scheme was developed by the research team in
a sequence of coding sessions, where two of the authors in-
dependently coded a subset of tweets, then discussed their
codes to simplify and streamline the task. We ended up with a
coding scheme that asks coders to rate:
• Does the tweet contains civil, mildly uncivil, or severely un-
civil content? As rater confusion was concentrated around
the “mildly uncivil” and “severely uncivil” categories, we
merged them into one “uncivil” label in the analysis.
• What type of negative interaction is in the tweet, if any?
Raters are allowed to assign multiple labels including per-
sonal attacks, accusations, other attacks against the candi-
date, attacks against the candidate’s affiliation or leadership,
and attacks against the candidate’s policy or political view.
• Does the tweet express support for the candidate, the candi-
date’s party affiliation, or his/her political views/policies?
Raters are allowed to assign multiple labels.
• Is the reply relevant to the original tweet? We asked raters to
choose a relevance label for each tweet among the following
options: irrelevant, same/similar topic, somewhat relevant,
and directly responding. In our analyses we converted the
last three labels into a single “relevant” category.
Tweets were coded individually using a web-based interface.
In each screen we present coders not only the reply tweet to
be annotated, but also the original tweet by the candidate for
context. In addition, the display included the candidate’s polit-
ical affiliation (Democrat or Republican). We did not expand
URLs or images in the original or reply tweets. The 800 tweets
were assigned to coders in random order. In total, five different
members of the research team labelled 800 tweets, with each
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Figure 4: Aggregating the scores of two human raters shows
significant agreement with the automatic classification results.
tweet being coded by two team members for a total of 1600
labels. We note that, in our estimate, coders exhibit liberal
leaning in terms of political preference and have higher than
average exposure to U.S. politics, though most of them were
U.S. residents but not U.S. citizens. Familiarity with politics
was required to allow the coders to label more complicated
questions, such as whether a tweet contains a political topic,
and whether comments on specific topics might be considered
subtly adversarial [33]. We excluded all tweets that coders
were not able to evaluate, most frequently when a tweet only
contained a URL (which we did not expand). Our final data
used in this analysis includes 690 tweets in total, 350 of them
come from the highly active group (Tactive,adv
⋃
Tactive,clean).
Human annotation exhibited significant agreement with
algorithm-labeled adversarial-ness. The raters were reasonably
consistent in evaluating whether a given reply to a candidate
contained content that can be labeled as “civil” or “uncivil”,
with 0.6 based on Cohen’s Kappa, high end of the moder-
ate agreement range. Figure 4 aggregates the civility ratings.
Tweets that were given “uncivil” scores by both raters are
marked in dark red while those that were given “civil” scores
by both raters are marked in light green and with a stripe pat-
tern. Tweets that were assigned with disagreeing labels are
marked in light red. The rows represent the sets of tweets
analyzed based on the group that produced them (active or
adversarial users), and whether the tweet was marked as ad-
versarial by the algorithm. From the top, the rows represent
Tactive,clean, Tadv,clean,Tactive,adv, and Tactive,adv.
The figure indicates the differences between the two groups,
as well as the performance of the 0.7-adversarial threshold
method. First, the chart indicates that 0.7-adversarial tweets
from both groups (bottom two rows) are indeed often labeled
as adversarial, with over 75% of the tweets in either row
marked as “uncivil” by both raters, and close to 100% marked
as “uncivil” by at least one rater. The trend is opposite for the
top two rows, showing that, while some tweets may be missed
by the algorithm, it is not likely to affect the classification
of adversarial users — the algorithm may miss more of their
tweets compared to other users’ adversarial tweets. Taken to-
gether, we conclude that the 0.7-adversarial threshold method
is an effective means to identify highly adversarial users. In
the following discussion, we take a deeper dive into a detailed
analysis on the diversity of tweets posted by these users.
We now compare the type of contents in our sample of tweets
by adversarial users (Tadv,adv
⋃
Tadv,clean) and our sample of
tweets by active users (Tactive,adv
⋃
Tactive,clean) in Figure 5. For
each tweet, we take the union of labels assigned by raters. We
use χ2 tests to compare the two groups, running tests sep-
arately for each category as the categories are not mutually
exclusive; the p-values we report on are significant even after
correcting for multiple tests. Note that similar to the above
analysis in Figure 4, our results likely underestimate the mag-
nitude of the difference between the groups, as the highly
active sample is drawn from a set that also contains the highly-
adversarial users as well as other users who are adversarial but
did not make the 11-tweet threshold for Uadv. Moreover, in
this analysis we use a balanced sample of tweets of each kind
(clean or adversarial) made by each group of users. In other
words, we are not just comparing the groups’ overall activities,
we are directly comparing “clean” and “adversarial” tweets
made by each group, showing the differences in types even
within these categories.
Figure 5a shows the manually-labeled categories assigned
to the users’ tweets. It is clear that the users in Uadv are
more likely to engage in personal attacks against candidates
(leftmost bar, χ2(1,N = 690) = 6.25, p < 0.05). On the
other hand, Figure 5b shows that Uactive users are more
likely to engage in supportive interactions with candidates
(of their own partisan affiliation, naturally). Particularly
they express support more frequently to the candidate them-
selves (χ2(1,N = 690) = 6.31, p < 0.05). Finally, Figure 5c
shows that when considering all tweets with agreeing labels,
highly active users were more likely to respond in a manner
that is relevant to the candidate tweet that they are replying
to (χ2(1,N = 492) = 6.95, p < 0.01).
We also compared the sets of candidates that Uadv and Uactive
replied to, as well as the sets these groups posted adversarial
replies to. Both groups seem to focus on the most “visible”
candidates. There were no significant differences in the set of
candidates being replied to between the two groups.
In summary, the results presented in Figure 5 expose different
types of adversarial engagements and interactions performed
by the highly-adversarial users. In particular, adversarial users
are more likely to engage in personal attacks and are less likely
to engage in other supportive interactions or respond with
relevant content with candidate tweets. In other words, the
difference in motivations of the adversarial users is manifested
in all their behaviors.
Analysis of user profiles. Table 2 shows indications that the
profiles of highly adversarial users’ accounts may differ from
that of other groups — specifically, the presence of a partisan
hashtag in the user profile has significant positive association
with the amount of adversarial interaction with political candi-
dates. To understand and elaborate on this trend we performed
a qualitative coding study of Twitter user profiles, to examine
how partisanship is represented differently in adversarial users’
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Figure 6: Highly adversarial users are more likely to include
attacks on the opposite party in their user profiles.
profiles. In addition, we examined whether these profiles are
more likely to appear anonymous.
In particular, we randomly selected 100 user profiles from
each of the following three groups: (1) random users: a set of
users chosen at random (denoted Ur); (2) highly adversarial:
users who have posted at least 11 adversarial tweets (Uadv as
defined above); and (3) active non-adversarial: a subset from
highly active users, who have posted at least 11 tweets and
never posted any adversarial tweet (Uactive,clean, 4,867 users in
total). The last group is different than Uactive in the previous
discussion from Figure 4 in that it specifically excludes users
posting adversarial content. We developed a coding scheme in
a sequence of coding sessions, where two of the authors coded
a subset of user profiles, then discussed their codes to focus
on the key differences between accounts in respect to this task.
Our coding scheme asks coders to rate user profiles as:
• Non-political: A profile without political topics or empty.
• Mentions political topic: User profiles that mention interest
in political topics, but do not suggest political leaning.
• Shows political leaning: User profiles that mention political
views and opinions (“liberal”, “Blue Lives Matter”) that do
not explicitly include partisan support.
• Partisan: User profiles explicitly expressing partisan sup-
port (“#MAGA”, “#BlueWave”).
• Partisan attack of opponents: User profiles attacking the
political opponent, their party or leadership (“Anti Trump”).
Two annotators independently coded each profile of our sam-
ple of 300 accounts. The rating was based on the user profile
details including Twitter handle, profile description, location
and name. Disagreements were resolved by a third annotator.
One of the user profiles was excluded from the data as no
consensus was reached.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of each category of user pro-
files for different groups. The histogram shows the categories
on the X-axis, and the number of users of each group whose
profile is in each category (Y-axis). The three groups are sig-
nificantly different (χ2(8,N = 299) = 21.99, p < 0.005). For
example, the random users were more likely (lightest column
in the leftmost group) to have non-political accounts, though a
majority of accounts across all the three groups were in that
category. On the other hand, the active and adversarial users
were more likely to show partisan support. However these
differences are not significant in a post-hoc analysis. More sig-
nificantly, highly adversarial users were more likely to express
their opposition to the opposing party in their user profile (the
rightmost dark column, χ2(2,N = 299) = 10.56, p < 0.01).
We also explored whether highly-adversarial users tend to use
accounts that appear anonymous (i.e. without clear identifying
information) more frequently than the other two groups. To
this end, we coded every profile as “presenting as anonymous”
or not. In other words, based on the profile handle, description,
and published name, we coded as “anonymous” those profiles
who cannot be connected to a specific individual (note that
we naturally cannot detect users who offer identifying details
that are not correct). While 48 out of the 100 random users
were labeled as anonymous, the active and the high-adversarial
groups had 63 out of 100 and 64 out of 100 anonymous pro-
files, respectively. The difference between these groups was
statistically significant (χ2(2,N = 300) = 6.6103, p < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
Our results provide some reflection on earlier findings on ad-
versarial behaviors in social media. One hypothesis from the
literature is that arbitrary users can turn adversarial given an
appropriately triggering context [11]. Our results do not refute
(or support) this hypothesis, but we do see an alternative pat-
tern of behavior: users that seem to seek out opportunities for
adversarial interactions. Two aspects of our analysis can be
interpreted as supporting this viewpoint. First, highly adver-
sarial users reply more in general to candidates from the party
the user opposes, suggesting that they are actively seeking out
these opportunities for cross-party communications. Second,
highly adversarial users are significantly more likely to have
profiles that include partisan attacks, suggesting an adversarial
disposition independent of any specific conversation.
Future research on improving online conversations can build
upon our observations. For example, our findings from both
qualitative and quantitative analyses show that users with
higher adversarial activity level engage in fewer supportive
interactions with political candidates. One possible direc-
tion as a future study is to further understand if encouraging
supportive interactions would decrease user participation in
adversarial behaviors. In addition, our analysis shows that
users with lower activity level have a higher participation in
adversarial behaviors as compared to their general posting ac-
tivities. While prior research often focus on how to encourage
user engagement from inactive users [48,58], it is as important
to understand how to encourage high-quality engagement.
Our findings offer design implications for tools assisting
human-in-the-loop content moderation in social media. For
example, our results show that highly adversarial users are
more likely to attack the opponent party in their user profiles,
suggesting that tools can be developed to surface users who
have expressed negativity explicitly in their profiles. This
would enable moderators to prioritize reviewing content gener-
ated by these users. Further, social media platforms could take
more granular measures to discourage users from seeking out
conflicts. For example, down-ranking toxic interactions with
public figures can both limit public exposure to the adversarial
behaviors and create more friction for conflict-seeking users.
Finally, we urge platforms to take stronger actions to help po-
litical figures against adversarial interactions on social media,
because of the ramifications for our democracy and society. In
line with prior findings on social media participation [47, 53],
“repeat” offenders contributed a large proportion of the adver-
sarial contents. These users might be good targets for punitive
actions by the platform, such as banning. Yet in our measure-
ments we saw that only 15% of the highly adversarial users
were later banned by Twitter.
Limitations. Our measurement study naturally suffers from
some limitations. First, our study, being observational, cannot
speak to the causal relationships between the variable we stud-
ied. Second, our focus was on the U.S. political system, and in
particular the elections for the U.S. House of Representatives;
the results may not generalize to other settings. Likewise, our
findings may also be skewed by the specific topics which were
in the news during the data collection period. For example, the
confirmation hearings for U.S. Supreme Court justice Brett
Kavanaugh were at the center of attention in that time period,
and may have triggered more or less adversarial interactions
than would be observed at other periods of time. In fact, as
we pointed out, previous studies on characterizing adversarial
behaviors under various scenarios on Twitter [9, 10, 23, 54]
reported differing trends on certain features in term of corre-
lations with adversarial activities. For example, [10] shows
that the number of followers a user has is positively correlated
with adversarial behaviors while [9, 54] and our study sug-
gest the opposite trend. This observation might suggest that
adversarial behaviors are contributed by different social media
populations and models need to be developed tailered to the
context. Therefore these results are not ready to be applied
directly on fully automated detection.
Third, our qualitative analysis is based on answers from raters
who exhibit liberal leaning. Recent research [37] has shown
that although people with different political leanings disagree
on the severity of uncivil tweets, they agree when distinguish-
ing uncivil tweets from civil ones. Nevertheless, it is possible
that a group of coders with more diverse political backgrounds
could bring a different perspective to the analysis. Fourth,
when annotating tweets, coders were exposed to the political
affiliation of the politicians. Although this design was inten-
tional in order to improve annotation quality, as many tweets
are hard to evaluate without this context, we acknowledge that
this may introduce bias into our analysis.
Finally, as previous works have pointed out [15, 33], harass-
ment detection based on machine learning tends to focus on
usage of offensive language, while having a high false negative
rate when classifying subtle adversarial content. Further, the
tool used in our analysis, Perspective API, does not include
Twitter in its training data. While we validated the precision of
our method in this and earlier work [33], our method may nev-
ertheless misses or ignores uncivil content not being flagged
and underestimate the amount of adversarial activities. In fact,
we showed in our qualitative analysis that our approach is
more likely to underestimate the amount of adversarial activi-
ties produced by highly adversarial users, which has minimal
impact for our results.
CONCLUSIONS
We studied users who engage in adversarial activities against
political candidates, with a dataset collected during the run-up
to the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. Using existing machine
learning tools, we found that while a significant number of ad-
versarial replies are made by those who tweeted to candidates
very few times over the data collection period, a small mi-
nority of active users is responsible for an outsized portion of
adversarial interactions. Using a combined approach with both
quantitative and qualitative analysis that used features specific
to the context of U.S. politics, we showed that for moderately
active users, those who are more adversarial are both less cen-
tral in the social graph consisting of users who interact with
candidates, and pay less attention to candidates of their own
partisan affiliation. When compared to highly active users,
highly adversarial users tend to focus their activities more on
negative interactions with candidates and less on supportive
ones. Our results also indicate that highly-adversarial users are
more likely to express negativity towards political opponents
in their user profiles. With these findings we hope to inform
future research in this area and encourage platform efforts in
protecting political figures from adversarial interactions.
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